Introduction
In the framework of cooperative game theory, many onepoint solution concepts called values have been proposed. For specific classes of cooperative games, some of the onepoint solutions possess interesting geometric relationships, for example three of the relevant one-point solutions are collinear, i.e., lie on the same line. Driessen and Funaki (1991) studied the collinearity between the Shapley value, the egalitarian non-separable contribution value (called ENSC-value) and the value representing the center of the imputation set (called C1S-value) for the class of cooperative games called the k-coalitional games. Here the collinearity of three values expresses that the corresponding one-point solutions for a certain type of a cooperative game lie on the same line.
In the present paper, we introduce a class of games called proportional average worth games (PAW-games), which strictly contains the subclass of those k-coalitional games for which the three above-mentioned values are collinear. An n-person game is said to be a proportional average worth game, if for any nontrivial coalition size, the differences of the so-called average worth per player are proportional to the differences of the average worth per player with respect to the coalition size n-1. The notion of average worth was used by Dragan (1992) to present an average per capita formula for the Shapley value. We show that in general, beside the Shapley value, the ENSC-value, the CIS-value, as well as the egalitarian non-average con-tribution value (called ENAC-value), recently introduced by Driessen and Funaki (1993 a) , can all be reformulated in terms of average worth with respect to particular coalition sizes, namely (n-1)-person, 1-person, and (n-2)-person coalitions, respectively. As a matter of fact, the notion of average worth is our main tool in establishing the collinearity of three of the four values on the class of PAWgames. The collinearity results concerning the k-coalitional games obtained by Driessen and Funaki (1991) are therefore reproved as special cases of the same properties for PAW-games.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with the formal definitions of the four values in question, the notion of average worth and the reformulations of all four values in terms of average worth. Two examples show that there are games in which the Shapley value is collinear with the ENSC-value and CIS-value, but the Shapley value is not collinear with the ENAC-value and CIS-value, and games in which there is no collinearity at all. In Sect. 3, we introduce the PAW-games and prove that for such games the Shapley value is collinear with the ENSC-value and CIS-value and also with the ENAC-value and CISvalue. For four-person games the collinearity is even a sufficient condition for being PAW-games, a fact which is not true in general, as shown by a five-person game discussed in the previous section. The unanimity games are PAWgames, but the sum of two PAW-games is not in general a PAW-game. Finally, Section 4 is devoted to the class of kcoalitional n-person games. The relationship between kcoalitional games and PAW-games is elucidated in the sense that each k-coalitional game for which the collinearity property between the Shapley value, the ENSC-value and the CIS-value holds, belongs to the class of PAWgames. An example shows that the latter class is strictly larger. The paper ends with the study of the class of landlord games; it is illustrated that the landlord games are PAW-games, but not necessarily k-coalitional games.
Notions and solution concepts
Let N be a finite set whose elements are called players. A cooperative or transferable utility game with player set N is a real-valued function v: 2 N ~ ~, on the set 2 N of all subsets of N, called coalitions. The worth v (S) of coalition SeN in the game v represents the total profits that the members of S can achieve due to their cooperative behaviour. It is a standard requirement that the empty coalition has no worth, i.e., v (~):=0. The number of players in a coalition S is denoted by ISI. As usual, the players in the game are numbered in such a way that N--{ 1, 2, 3 ..... n}, where n=lNI, n>3. The class of all cooperative n-person games is denoted by G".
The solution part of cooperative game theory focuses on the essential problem how to divide the overall profits v (N) of the grand coalition among the players of the n-person game v. Four one-point solution concepts for cooperative games will be considered in this paper. The most well-known one-point solution concept has been introduced axiomatically by Shapley (1953 
Shi(v)= ~, (n!)-l(s-1)!(n-s)![v(S)-v(S\{i})] (2.1)

SeN; ieS
where s=lSI for any SeN. As the Shapley value has many nice properties, making it perhaps the most popular solution, its computation may be regarded as a central problem. All algorithms (cf. [8] , [10] ) have the complexities O (n 9 2~), which makes the computation of the Shapley value tough for large n. For the purpose of simplification of computation, we compare the Shapley value concept with three easier computable solution concepts. The three one-point solution concepts have similar interpretations in the sense that the remaining overall profits are divided equally, given that each player is already paid some specified individual contribution. The individual contribution of any player i~N in an n-person game v may be determined in one of the next three ways: Subsequently, the egalitarian division of the surplus of the overall profits gives rise to three one-point solution concepts of the same kind, the value representing the center of the imputation set (CIS-value), the egalitarian nonseparable contribution value (ENSC-value), and the egalitarian non-average contribution value ( ENA C-value), respectively. The CIS-value of an n-person game v is formally defined by Similarly, the ENSC-value and the ENAC-value are formally defined by
for all ieN. Note that the computation of the CIS-value, the ENSC-value and the ENAC-value requires beside the worth of the grand coalition, only the data of the 1-person, (n-1)-person and (n-2)-person coalitions, respectively. The next theorem states important results for the four values, that will be used throughout the paper; they will be expressed in terms of so-called average worth and the new formulas will replace (2.1)-(2.6). 
Proof (i) Distinguishing coalitions with different sizes and coalitions containing player i or not, we deduce from the classical formula (2.1) for the Shapley value that
,,=, kh) Ls r,, I
Substituting (2 9 and (2.8) respectively, we obtain
This proves part (i).
(ii) The proof of this part is left to the reader. (iii) From (2.5), (2.2) and (2.7), (2.8) applied to h=n-1, we derive
(iv) From (2.6), (2.3) and (2.7), (2.8) applied to h = n-2, we derive
The form (2.9) of the Shapley value formula has been introduced and proved by Dragan (1992) . Because this average per capita formula for the Shapley value is our most important tool in this paper, we gave its proof here. A similar, but different average per capita formula for the Shapley value was used by Peleg (1992) in some game theoretic approach to voting theory by count and account. The ENSC-value and the CIS-value are well known concepts in the game theoretic literature (cf. [2] , [3] , [4] , [6] , [7] , [9] , [11] , [14] ). The ENAC-value has been introduced by Driessen and Funaki (1993a) , who presented three motivations for the study of this value 9 The formula (2.12) for the ENAC-value, which is the sum of the egalitarian division of the overall profits and some part of the difference between two average worth with respect to (n-2)-person In the next sections, we shall provide two types of sufficient conditions on the game so that the one-point solutions according to the Shapley value, the ENSC-value (or ENAC-value) and the CIS-value are collinear (i.e., lie on the same line). The importance of the collinearity property of three values (including the Shapley value) may be twofold. On the one hand the collinearity property may simplify (to some extent) the computation of the Shapley value (its simplification of computation, however, depends strongly on the complexity of the verification of the underlying condition guaranteeing the collinearity property of values), on the other the collinearity property is interesting on its own for the sake of comparison of values (e.g., to conclude which of the three onepoint solutions is the best or the worst for any of the players).
In the context of colliuearity properties of several values, we may restrict ourselves, without loss of generality, to the class G~' of zero-normalized n-person games defined by G~:={ w G"I v ({ i})=0 for all i ~N}. Indeed, the process of zero-normalization transforms an arbitrary n-person game v into the corresponding zero-normalized game w ~ G n given by
and it is straightforward to verify that each of the four values behaves nicely, i.e.,
~(w)=G(v)-(v({ 1}), v({2}) ..... v({n}))
for any value ~e {Sh, ENSC, ENAC, CIS}. Therefore, the collinearity properties will not be affected by zero-normalization. Henceforward, we shall frequently use the results listed in the next corollary.
Corollary 2.3. Let w Gj , n23, and i ~ N. We have
We conclude this section with two examples which will illustrate the lack of collinearity. Notice that for v 9 Gg, we have always
Sh (v) =-~ENSC(v) +~CIS (v) and ENAC (v) = CIS (v),
so that we should consider games with at least four players to show the lack of collinearity.
Straightforward calculations yield all average worth as well as all differences of average worth: Conditions (3.1) express that for any nontrivial coalition size, the differences of the average worth per player are proportional to the differences of such averages for the coalition size n-1. Clearly, each zero-normalized 3-person game is a PAWgame, because (3.1) holds with c2=1. Further, each zeronormalized symmetric n-person game v, i.e., v(S)=v(T) whenever ISI=ITI, is a PAW-game, since vh= v/, for all ie N, all 1 <h<n-1. For another type of PAW-games see Example 3.5. According to the next proposition, a PAW-game can also be characterized in terms of the consistency of a certain system of quadratic equations 9 
i (v) = n-1 Vn = ENSC i (v) = CIS i (v).
This coincidence of the three solution concepts with the egalitarian division rule of the overall profits is interpreted as a case of degenerated collinearity; in fact, we have also ENACiv)=CIS iv). Now, we shall give the interesting properties of the PAWgames which motivated us in introducing and studying this class of games 9 
v) = p ENSC(v) + (1 -p) CIS(v), where p = ~, h -~ ch h=2
Proof Suppose that v e G~is a PAW-game, i.e., (3,1) holds. Then, (3.2) also holds by choosing di=vn_l-vi I for all ie N, (,,_l= 1 and gh=Ch for all 2<h<n-2. To prove the converse implication, suppose that (3.2) holds. In particular,
i -diforallieN, whereg~_l~O. Now, wehavevn-l-Vn-l=cn 1 it follows that vh-v~=((~ 1) -1 (h(v~-i-v~, 1) for all i~N, all 2<<_h<n-1.
So, (3.2) implies (3.1); this establishes the equivalence of (3.1) and (3.2).
Let us give some remarks about this characterization of a zero-normalized n-person PAW-game. The system (3.2) has n (n-2) quadratic equations in the 2n-2 unknowns 6h, 2 < h < n-1, and dg, ie N, whereas the left hand sides of (3.2) are determined by the data of the game v. Consider the quadratic subsystem of (3.2) for a fixed coalition size h, namely Vh-Vih=6h d i for all ieN. In case that all left hand sides are zero, we take gh=0 and the unknowns d i, ieN, remain arbitrary. In case that there are nonzero left hand sides, we should have 6hr and the unknowns d i, ie N, are determined by di=(~h) 1 (Vh_Vih) for all i~ N, where ch remains arbitrary. Particularly, each such subsystem of (3.2) should be consistent with the special subsystem of (3.2) given by di=(g~_l) -1 (Vn_l-V ~ 1) for all i~N. In other words, the consistency of two such subsystems requires that the corresponding ratio Ch(Cn_l) -1 is uniquely determined by the ratios (vh--vih) (vn_rv'~_l) -1, ieN, provided that the denominator is not zero 9 If the consistency is met, then one of the numbers Ch, 2<h<n-1, is usually undetermined and it is standard to put g~ 1 = 1.
An important observation is that the collinearity property with respect to Sh, ENSC and CIS may hold although the game is not a PAW-game. Indeed, for the game v of Example 2.5 conditions (3 9 can not be met because 
Note that if a PAW-game ve G~ satisfies vn_l-vi~_l=O for all is N, or equivalently ENSC(v)= CIS(v), then it fol-(iii) Let n > 4 and ENAC (v) r CIS (v). Then, the collinearity property holds" with respect to Sh, ENAC and CIS, i.e., (n-2)p Sh(v) = )" ENAC(v) + (1 -7) CIS(v), where 7 -(n -1) c,,_2
Proof From formulas (2.13)-(2.15) and conditions (3.1) we derive that for all ieN n--1
Shi iv) = n I v~ + ~ h -1 (vt, -vii,)
h=2 = n -1 vn + h -1 ch (v,,-i -v,,-1 ) = CISi (v) + p[ENSCi (v) -C1Si (v)] = p ENSCi (v) + (1 -p) CISi (v).
This proves parts (i) and (ii). In order to prove part (iii), if ENACj.(v)e:CISj(v)
for some jeN, then (2.16) implies vn 2-V~_e;e0 and thus, cn 2~0 by applying (3.1) for h=n-2. Therefore, we have
for all ie N. From this and part (ii), we conclude
Sh (v) = CIS (v) + p [ ENSC (v)-CIS (v)] =CIS(v)+[(n-1) Cn_e] -1 (n-2) 9 p [ENA C (v)-CIS (v)} = CIS (v) + y[ENA C (v)-CIS (v)] = yENA C (v) + (1-7) CIS (v).
For a 4-person game the converse of part (ii) holds, as shown by: 
"~(V3--1~5)'t-g(V2--V2)=(~(V3--F3)
for all ieN, some 6e R, or equivalently, v2-v~=2 (6 -1) (v3-v ~) for all ieN, some 6e R.
The latter statement is fully equivalent to conditions (3.1) . Note that such a result for games with more than four players is not true, as illustrated by Example 2.5, where we presented a 5-person game with the collinearity property which was not a PAW-game. Now, we shall show that all unanimity games which are zero-normalized are PAW-games. Obviously, these games form a basis for the linear space G~ of zero-normalized nperson games; however, not every game in G~ is a PAWgame, because the class of zero-normalized PAW-games is not closed under addition, i.e., the sum of two n-person PAW-games is not necessarily a PAW-game. 
From this we conclude that for any i e N and any 1 < h < n-1, we have the results (UT)h--(UT)h=O if 1 <h<t and J(~)-I (~_-t,) if ieT, t<h<_n-1, (HT)h--(HT)~I :|-t [n~-l{n-t~ ifi~T,t<h<n
1.
[,,-,th) ~h ,1
We notice that if 2<_t<n-1, then any corresponding unanimity game u T satisfies (3.2) with (h=0 for all 2<<_h<t,
(:) '(n-t) n forallt<h<n-l, and ct, = h-t n-t --d i-n-t
ifieT, ord i=-~t ifi~T. 
In particular, conditions (3.1) hold with ch=0 for all l<h<t, and Ch=(n71) -l (h) for all t<h<n-1, provided 2<t<n-1. We conclude that the zero-normalized unanimity games u T, T<N, with ITl>2 are PAW-games. According to Theorem 3.3 (ii), the collinearity property holds, that is Sh (ur)= CIS (ur) + p [ENSC (ur)-CIS (ur)], where pe N is determined by
The latter equality can be proved in an inductive manner by induction on n. Its proof is left to the reader. Two other examples dealing with PAW-games can be found at the end of the next section (see Examples 4.4 and 4.6).
Collinearity of values on the class of k-coalitional games
Driessen and Funaki (1991) introduced the class of"k-coalitional games" and proved that under some additional condition, the collinearity between the Shapley value, the ENSC-value and the CIS-value holds for such games. The goal of this section is to investigate the relationship between the classes of k-coalitional games and PAW-games. This definition could be interpreted as follows. There are three types of coalitions in a k-coalitional game; essential coalitions, which consist of exactly k players, small coalitions, having less than k players, and large coalitions, with more than k players and different from the grand coalition N. The numbers aTe ~ represent the maximal profit obtainable from the formation of the essential coalition T within any large coalition. Generally speaking, the worth of any large coalition described by (4.1) may be fully independent of the worth v (73, TcS, of essential coalitions. However, if it happens that the profit aT of any essential coalition T for its formation within a large coalition is the same as the worth v(T) of the essential coalition in the game v, then the worth of any large coalition by (4.1) is fully determined by the worth of the essential subcoalitions and the constant corresponding to the size of the large coalition. The latter situation is found for example in any unanimity game un, RcN, R,N, O. If hRl=k, the unanim-I. Dragan etaL: Collinearity in cooperative games ity game u R is a k-coalitional game, since the conditions (4.1) hold with c~ r = u R (7) for all Te F k and 7k+ 1 -= Yk+2 ..... y.__l=0 and obviously the symmetry conditions for small coalitions hold either. Now, we treat a preliminary lemma involving k-coalitional games for the sake of comparison with PAW-games. We state the lemlna for k-coalitionat games with 1 <_k<_n-2. First we mention that, in case k=n-1, we have vh=v ~ for all i~N, all l<h<n-1, due to the symmetry, so the Shapley value reduces to Shi(v) =n -1 v,,+(n-1) -1.  (v,,_1-v~_t) for all is N. This wilt be a result agreeing with the last statement in the lemma. h~=kh-tlkl =1~ ( kll ; but this is a formula which can easily be proved by induction on n (n>k+ 1), so that it has been left to the reader at the end of the previous section.
Note that the results of Lemma 4.2 hold also for k= n' 1, as it can be seen by comparing the statement with the remark preceeding the lemma. Now, the lemma is the main tool in proving the central result. Thus, conditions (3.1) hold with Ch=(n-t) -I h for all 2<h<n-1. Hence, v is a PAW-game and the collinearity property follows from Theorem 3.3 (ii), where the coefficient p is computed by n-1 n-1
Theorem 4.3. Let v E G'~, and n > 3. (i) Suppose that v is 1-coalitional. Then, v is a PAW-game and the cotlinearity properO, holds, namely
Sh (v)=(n-1) -l (n-2) ENSC (v)+(n-t) -I CIS (v).
Moreover, ENAC (v)=ENSC (v) whenever n>4. ( ii ) Suppose that v is ( n-1)-coalitionat. Then, v is a PAWgame and the collinearity property holds, namely
Sh (v) = (n -1 )-~ ENSC (v) + (n -1 )-1 (n-2) CIS (v).
Moreover, ENAC (v)=CIS (v). (iii) Suppose that v is k-coalitional
(ii) Obviously, (3.1) holds for an (n-1)-coalitional game by choosing c~_1=1 and ch=O for all 2<h_<n-2. Thus, v is a PAW-game and the collinearity property holds. Note that (1,) , ENSC (v) and CIS (v) are collinear payoff vectors, are PAW-games. The corresponding formulas involving the collinearity of the three vectors were proved by Driessen and Funaki (1991) using different methods (see Theorems 6.3, 6.6 and 6.9 there). The reader may verify that condition (4.3) is equivalent to the corresponding condition of Theorem 6.9 in [4] . We emphasize that the result of Theorem 4.3 (iii) above is more precise than the result of Theorem 6.9 in [4] , due to the fact that condition (4.3) is not only sufficient but also necessary for the collinearity property of zero-normalized kcoalitional games with 2<_k<n-2.
Now, we present an example of a PAW-game which is not k-coalitional for any integer k, 1 -< k -< n-1. As any PAWgame has the collinearity property, a fact shown by Theorem 3.3, this means that by introducing the PAW-games we have enlarged the class of games for which it is known that the Shapley value is easily computable due to the collinearity. The example shows also an easy way of using Lemma 4.2 for proving that a game is not k-coalitional. (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) , EN~C (v)=~ (6, 1, 1, 1, 1 Example 4.6. Let player 1 be a landowner and players 2, 3 ..... m+ 1 landless peasants of the same type who have nothing to contribute but their labour in order to cultivate the land. Let f:{0, 1 ..... m} ~ R be a production function, wheref(t) represents the monetary value of the crop of the land cultivated by t peasants, O<t<m, who are hired by the landowner. It is supposed that the landowner by himself can not produce anything, i,e.,f(0)=0, and thatf is a nondecreasing function, i.e., f (t+l)>f (t) for all O<_t<_m-1. This economic situation can be modelled as a cooperative (m+l)-person game v with player set N= {1, 2, 3 ..... m+ 1 }, m_> 1, whose characteristic function Thus, the worth of any coalition containing the landowner equals the monetary output produced by the peasants in the coalition. Any coalition consisting of peasants only has no worth, since the peasants do not own any land. Notice
